Challenges of Running a University in India

Three key challenges are: (1) trust and trustworthiness, (2) balance of vigilance and docility, and most important, (3) the regard for public goods.

When people do not trust others to do the right thing, or do not deserve to be trusted to do the right thing, we try to make up for the trust deficit by writing down rules and procedures to impose order and bring about some predictability. Unfortunately, rules are poor substitutes for judgment, and coarsen communication, relationships, and performance in workplace and in society at large. But in absence of trust, there are no clear alternatives to rules. If a powerful politician calls the director/vice-chancellor of a university demanding the opportunity to speak to the community for political purposes, he/she is violating the trust placed in him/her by the public. The system reacts by trying to draft rules on who can and cannot speak, erring on the side of isolating the university community from legitimate and rich social and political engagement. If a member of faculty uses university resources for personal benefit, the system reacts by drafting rules that err on the side of preventing efficient and legitimate uses of resources. One can come up with many examples. In universities where the output of faculty (and the university) is so difficult to measure, this problem is especially critical, and writing of rules to try to measure faculty's intellectual contributions just makes it worse. What scares most people about taking such responsibilities is walking into an environment where trust and trustworthiness are weak, and not valued sufficiently by the governance structure and the community at large.

Universities, like all societies, face the problem of dispersed information (Nobel Laureate F. A. Hayek, American Economic Review 1945). On one hand it is critical that all people in positions of power be monitored by those who have the information about the consequences of their actions (e.g., employees, faculty, and students in the university and general public in society). On the other hand, it is also important that those who are governed have a degree of docility (Nobel Laureate Herbert A. Simon, American Economic Review 1993) to accept the decisions of legitimate authority even if they impose some inconvenience, and give the authority some benefit of doubt, instead of rising immediately in protest against every and all actions which are, or appear to be, ill-advised. Protests carried out judiciously help governance of the system by feeding information to those who run the place; indiscriminate protests vitiate the environment, destroy reputations, and push authority into a defensive posture behind the rules and become non-transparent. The second fear that scares people from accepting such positions is the risk that the governance structure and the community may not act with a reasonable balance between vigilance and docility.

The third, and in my assessment the most important, issue is the lack of regard for public goods and externalities. Excessive regard for private goods (my house, my car, my children, my safety) without balancing it with public goods/bads (filth outside my house, effect of my car on city air, traffic congestion, and walkability of the street outside my house, effect of private schools on quality of public education, effect of street parking of cars in residential neighborhoods blocking access of fire engines) are just a few examples. Although these examples are chosen from everyday life, they are also applicable to academia. In fact, academic communities often have more intense externalities than elsewhere,with actions of  members of a university having important impact on others. For example, when one faculty member lingers over a cup of tea to arrive late in the class, it affects the punctuality of students in all other classes. The possibility that the community may not value the public goods sufficiently, and transfer the burden of recognizing and enforcing the consequences of extensive externalities within the university to the director scares potential candidates. Such a responsibility immediately puts the director in an untenable position.

None of these three factors belong to the category that (like material resources) either the Board of Governors or the Ministry of Human Resource Development can offer a candidate on a platter. However, the former can, in their own day-to-day functions and decisions, consider how their choices will have consequences along these three dimensions. The same applies to the faculty and staff. Building a fruitful and rewarding academic institution is like growing a tree. No matter how badly I wish to eat mango for dinner today, my ability to do so depends on whether I planted and nurtured a mango tree over the past ten years. Likewise, if I wish to have mango on the table ten years from now, time to start is now. When even the subsidized apex institutions like IITs and IIMs focus their primary attention on the revenue generating degrees (B.Tech. and MBAs respectively) instead of dealing with the problem of insufficient top talent in teaching and scholarship by using their subsidies to support the negative-revenue PhD programs, it is clear that we have some distance to go to recognize and deal with the externalities in the domain of higher education in India.

Problems of Higher Education in India

If and when the fast growing crisis of higher education in India is recognized by government, business community, faculty, students, and the public, solutions to the problem would have to be devised from within. Outside solutions are unlikely to work, and will likely be rejected by a proud society.

Broadly speaking, solutions are needed for (1) attracting a significant number of top students from each year's class to universities as teachers and researchers (i.e., get India's Einsteins into universities instead of selling soap, trading securities, or writing computer code); (2) finding a way of financing higher education through a judicious combination of government grants, private philanthropy, student fees, and royalties from research--this will have to be accomplished without profit-seeking capital in higher education because nobody in the world has yet found a way of delivering quality education without significant subsidies; (3) persuading business and political communities and it is in their own best long-run interest to strengthen delivery of quality of higher education by abandoning their pursuit of profits from education in favor of donations; (4) improving the governance of colleges, universities and their regulators through training, legislation, and restructuring; (5) enforcement of Societies Act and transparent public financial reporting by all organizations and institutions of higher education; and (6) amendment of India's Constitution to eliminate the special status granted therein to the teachers.

How these and other goals are to be achieved has to be worked out through discussion and debate in India. On problem No. 1 listed above (attracting more of the top talent from each year's class into teaching and scholarship to do innovation in India) everyone in India seems to think that somehow the US and UK universities will solve India's problem. They can't and they won't. India (like China) is too big. These two countries have to solve their talent-in-teaching-shortage by themselves. Simply trying attract more people from US universities (on sabbatical, or otherwise) will not work, because about 500 other universities in India, and a few thousand others around the world are trying to do exactly the same thing. Many efforts amount to adding more straws to the same glass without adding any water to drink.

Yet, we do not get many bright people from India applying to "free" PHD education in US universities because selling "soap" offers more attractive "packages." And for Indian universities, PHD is a low priority, if they can attract bright students at all. Private universities have no interest in money losing propositions. So, most  everyone is chasing the revenue generating degree programs with little attention to the money-eating PhD programs, hoping that someone else will spend the money, solve the problem, and they can hire the PHD graduates to teach at their own institutions. For all universities in India, the number of PhDs getting science and engg. PhDs is no more than 7 thousand per year. There are some 3400 engineering schools alone.

Not surprisingly, I would like to see more attention to PhD programs, especially at government subsidized apex institutions. Further, revenue generation from alums and other benefactors to subsidize quality education should be a high priority. Quality faculty contributions are difficult to measure, and certainly not by the number of hours spent in the office. This calls for reconsideration of not only the culture of the Institute but also of the rules by which it is run. Civil service rulebook tends to kill off most innovation in Indian universities.

Renovating India's Higher Education

Yash  Pal Committee Report on Higher Education in India: A Review

The Committee to Advise on Renovation and Rejuvenation of Higher Education (the Yash Pal Committee) has submitted its report to the Union Minister of Education on June 23, 2009. Given the wide-spread concerns about the current state and trends in India's higher education system, the report could not come at a better time when the new government may want to take major steps to improve higher education.

The Report, written by a panel of eminent educationists, identifies some major weaknesses of the current system that include disciplinary fragmentation and isolation, separation of instruction from exploration, proliferation of single-discipline institutes, erosion of autonomy and democratic spirit of freedom of thought, unattractiveness of careers in education to the talented youth, excessive commercialization, uneven accessibility, poor financing, governance and management, and excessive and inappropriate regulation of colleges and universities. Political pressures and control from the outside find internal resonance in the interested parties within these institutions, often generating resource and attention consuming litigation and many conflicts which are unrelated to their educational mission.

The Committee proposes a bold structural move in creation of a new constitutional body, National Commission for Higher Education and Research (NCHER), to takeover the responsibilities of the Universities Grants Commission, the All India Council for Technical Education, and all educational aspects of 13 professional regulatory bodies such as the Bar Council of India. The Commission will be directly responsible to the Parliament, along the lines of the National Election Commission, to protect it from political interference.

The Commission will serve as the apex regulatory body in the field of higher education in India and seek to redefine the higher education through (1) developing a vision of higher education as reflected in framework for curricula, university benchmarks, international comparisons, educational policies including costs and pricing; (2) advising the union and state governments, (3) creating norms, processes and structures for entry, accreditation, and exit of institutions and programs; (4) developing sources and mechanisms for funding; (5) promote effective and transparent governance; (6) creating a national database on higher education; (7) promoting an environment to attract talented youth to education and research; (8) creating processes for richer environment for learning and exploration through softer interaction among students and teachers; (9) finding ways of gradually freeing the universities from the administrative burdens of affiliated colleges; and (10) reporting annually to the Parliament on the state of higher education.

This three paragraph summary does not do justice to the grand vision of the future of India's higher education that motivates this 94-page document. Every system, no matter how inefficient and dysfunctional, has plenty of beneficiaries. Threatened by proposals for reform, they stand ready with their inside knowledge to rip the reform proposals apart by line, paragraph and chapter. Where is the evidence for this? Prove it first. But as Samuel Johnson said: Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must first be removed.  The Government of India has a clear choice ahead "act now, or spend its five-year term dealing with the objections.

The Report can, however, be improved by strengthening some of its recommendations. It underplays the severity of shortage of talent in higher education and research and the weakness and consequences of the for-profit "investment" model of higher education for quality and innovation. It hardly mentions the responsibility of the business corporation in supporting higher education and does not adequately promote the benefits of regulatory competition in the vast Indian system. Let us consider each of these issues briefly.

Many of the ills of Indian higher education can be linked to the quality of talent in the field. A significant number of the best minds of each year's graduates will have to be attracted to instruction and research for the Committee's recommendations to have any chance of success. Perhaps the President of India could congratulate the top 1 percent of each year's undergraduate class through a letter, letting them know that as exceptional people, they are invited to pursue post-graduate studies with a government fellowship in any field at a university (in India or abroad) that admits them at any time during the five years following graduation. If even a small proportion of such talented graduates accept this offer of a Presidential Fellowship, we shall have significantly increased the flow of talent into education within a decade or so.

In addition to educating some 40 lakh new graduates, Indian colleges and universities also must also educate about 4 lakh new instructors each year. If undergraduate classroom is the wheat farm, the graduate program is its seed farm; whether we eat or starve tomorrow depends on the quality of grain saved as the seed. At present Indian universities grant some 17,000 PhD degrees annually across all fields and, in the judgment of many educators, of mixed quality. Graduate programs, like seed farms, are extremely expensive to run, and yield little revenue to motivate profit-making colleges. Profit-making companies do not invest in educating educators and exacerbate the problem in India. To create and sustain a good system of higher education, the Commission will have to have a "seed farm" division of its own to deal with the problem.

No university in the world has found a way of delivering quality higher education without government or charitable subsidy. Quality education is expensive, and anyone who can figure out a way of running a world class (or even average) university at profit deserves at least a Nobel Prize. Since none of the top 500 universities across the world is run without large subsidies, the source of widespread belief in India that investment by profit-seeking organizations "whether foreign or domestic "in higher education will help deliver quality education is a mystery. There is no such thing as commercially viable higher education beyond low-level vocational education.

While declining in relative importance, government employment is still important in India. Strict written definitions of qualifications for government jobs requiring specific subjects sustain the compartmentalization of education in universities. The Committee's recommendation on lowering the walls among the disciplines should be accompanied by greater flexibility in defining educational requirements for jobs and allowing greater role for judgment by the recruiting personnel for government.

The Committee's recognition of the diverse skills needed for management of various operations of universities calls for care in education, training and selection of administrators. Managing academic (programs, faculty recruitment and promotion, admissions, curriculum and budgeting), financial, facilities, personnel, government, community, governance, and fundraising operations of universities requires a diversity of skills. The NCHER would do well to help universities build such management capabilities and do appropriate succession planning. Improving the management of universities will help increase the chance of success in reaching the goal of university autonomy.

A great many institutions of secondary and higher education in India were created and are run well by charitable trusts. However, the same charitable trust has also become a veil for colleges run by operators who see them as little more than profit-making businesses. The Commission will have to make sure that the not-for-profit trusts are true to their legal charter and do not leak funds to their controlling parasites. Alumni of these institutions could be given a voice in helping the Commission evaluate the operations of colleges run by the trusts.

Finally, the proposed new structure of the Commission should have appropriate features to protect it from the conditions that led to failures of the structures is will replace. Monopoly regulatory power over higher education for a population of 1.15 billion presents a prima facie risk of getting mired again in inefficient procedures and rules. The Committee Report itself recognizes that one-size-fits-all regulation of higher education will not work. For this reason, the Government of India would be better advised to adopt a model of regulatory competition by creating not one but two, or perhaps three such commissions, each acting independently with jurisdiction over the entire country.  Absence of monopoly regulatory power will induce these commissions to compete, innovate by trying different models and ideas, allow experimentation, comparisons, imitation and rejection, and ultimately evolve a complex diverse matrix of institutions of higher education appropriate for a large fast developing country to support its ambitions to join countries of the first rank in the world.